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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 282, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5501 
SENECA TRANSIT SERVICE, 
Employer. 
MATTHEW J. FUSCO, ESQ., for Petitioner 
ROY R. GALEWSKI, ESQ., for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On February 11, 2005, the Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 282 filed, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a 
timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive representative of certain employees 
of the Seneca Transit Service. 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: Drivers. 
Excluded: All others. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on June 1, 2005, at 
which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
Case No. C- 5501 - 2 -
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 23, 2005 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
U4*Zteu/i.<-*=^£-~0-r 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NELSON C. PEREZ, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-25565 
- and -
SUBWAY SURFACE SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, 
-and-
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
NELSON C. PEREZ, pro se 
STUART SALLES, ESQ. for Respondent 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL 
(JOYCE R. ELLMAN of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Nelson Perez to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing the improper practice charge, as amended, 
in which Perez alleged that the Subway Surface Supervisors Association (SSSA) had 
violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when one of 
its representatives gave Perez arbitrary advice about his seniority rights. The New York 
City Transit Authority (Authority), Perez' employer, was made a statutory party pursuant 
to§209-a.3oftheAct. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
Perez filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred in 
dismissing his charge. The Authority and SSSA have filed responses to the exceptions 
arguing that the exceptions are untimely and should be dismissed, but otherwise 
supporting the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, 
we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the ALJ's decision and are repeated here only as 
necessary to decide the exceptions.1 
Perez filed an improper practice charge on December 6, 2004, alleging that the 
SSSA representative had given him advice about his seniority rights that Perez believes 
is incorrect and self-serving. A pre-hearing conference was held and the charge was 
clarified to state: 
that on November 30, 2004, Mr. James Cassino, an SSSA 
representative, gave Mr. Perez advice that was arbitrary, 
discriminatory and/or in bad faith. The advice in question is 
Mr. Cassino's alleged statement that if Mr. Perez stayed in 
the Brooklyn Division instead of returning to Staten Island 
Division, once a Staten Island position was offered to him, 
he would be placed at the bottom of the Brooklyn Division's 
seniority list. 
1
 38 PERB H4534 (2005). 
2The Authority asserts in its answer that Perez was initially assigned as a Surface Line 
Dispatcher to the Brooklyn Division in July 2000. In July 2003, Perez was assigned to 
the Staten Island Division of the Authority. In July 2004, he was reassigned to the 
Brooklyn Division due to a limited number of available budgeted positions in Staten 
Island and because of his seniority. In January 2005, Perez was reassigned to Staten 
Island due to vacancies in that Division and with his seniority intact. 
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In the charge, Perez acknowledges that Cassino advised him that if he believed 
Cassino was mistaken to stay in Brooklyn with his seniority, then Cassino would "fight 
this". Perez was unhappy with the response. Cassino advised him that SSSA would 
proceed further and hoped to be successful. Perez did not file a grievance or request 
SSSA to do so. Perez asserts in his original charge that, while he was involuntarily 
transferred to Brooklyn in 2004, with his seniority from Staten Island, even though 
positions have opened up in Staten Island, he would prefer to stay in Brooklyn and 
retain his seniority. He argues that he should not have to give up his preferred position 
in Brooklyn just because his former position is now available in Staten Island. 
The conference ALJ gave permission to SSSA to file a motion to dismiss and to 
the Authority to file a motion to be removed as a statutory party. Such motions were 
thereafter filed and Perez was given the opportunity to file papers in opposition to the 
motions, but he did not do so. 
By decision dated June 16, 2005, both motions were granted: the Authority was 
released as a statutory party and the charge was dismissed. The ALJ found that the 
Authority was not a statutory party because the charge did not allege a breach of the 
duty of fair representation "in the processing of or failure to process a claim that the 
public employer has breached its agreement with such employee organization."3 The 
charge was dismissed as against the SSSA for failure of proof that Cassino's advice to 
Perez was arbitrary, discriminatory or made in bad faith. 
The Authority asserts that it received, by certified mail, its copy of the ALJ's 
decision on June 21, 2005. The first time the decision was sent to Perez via certified 
3
 Act, §209-a.3. 
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mail, it was returned as undelivered. The ALJ's decision was sent again via certified 
mail on July 21, 2005, and Perez received it on July 27, 2005. Perez' exceptions, sworn 
to on August 15, 2005, were received by the Board on August 16, 2005, and by the 
Authority on August 17, 2005. 
DISCUSSION 
Section 204.10 of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules) requires that exceptions to 
an ALJ's decision be filed within fifteen working days after the party's receipt of the 
decision. Perez received the ALJ's decision on July 27, 2005, therefore, his exceptions 
would be timely if filed by August 17, 2005. Perez' exceptions were received by the 
Board on August 16, 2005, and are, therefore, timely. 
Perez disagrees with Cassino's assessment of Perez' right to retain his seniority 
if he remained in Brooklyn.4 Cassino's offer to take the matter further was not pursued 
by Perez. Perez did not file a grievance, instead he filed the instant improper practice 
charge. However, that Cassino's advice was not consistent with Perez's understanding 
of his seniority rights does not constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation by 
SSSA.5 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny Perez' exceptions and affirm the decision of 
theALJ. 
4
 To the extent that Perez disputes in his exceptions the statements in Cassino's 
affadavits, as Perez did not respond to the motions to dismiss, he is now precluded from 
raising this issue on appeal. 
5See New York State Court Clerks Ass'n (Janay), 36 PERB 1J3041 (2003); Oneida 
County Deputy Sheriff's Benevolent Ass'n (Kulesa), 33 PERB 1J3037 (2000). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge is hereby dismissed in its 
entirety. 
DATED: September 23, 2005 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Jphn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BARBARA MALONEY-BELTON, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-25923 
ROSLYN UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT and 
ROSLYN CUSTODIAL, BUS DRIVERS AND 
MAINTENANCE ASSOCIATION, 
Respondents. 
WOLIN & WOLIN (ALAN E. WOLIN of counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Barbara Maloney-Belton to a 
decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director), 
dismissing her charge which alleged that the Roslyn Union Free School District (District) 
violated §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when, 
subsequent to her retirement as a bus attendant, the District discontinued her health 
insurance coverage in retaliation for her friendship with the former president of the 
Association. As to the Association, Maloney-Belton alleged that it violated §209-a.2(a) 
of the Act by not permitting her to be included in its bargaining unit. 
By letter dated May 12, 2005, the Director informed Maloney-Belton that her 
charge was deficient because she failed to allege a violation against the Association 
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within four months of the date of the filing of the charge; because she was never 
included in the bargaining unit and because she was not and is not a public employee. 
She was advised that, unless corrected by May 27, 2005, the charge would be 
dismissed. In response, Maloney-Belton informed the Director that she intended to file 
exceptions to his deficiency determination. 
EXCEPTIONS 
Maloney-Belton contends in her exceptions that the Director's deficiency 
determination is in error because, as a lunch monitor, she remains a public employee of 
the District and, as such, is still covered by the Act, and that the charge is timely. 
The District and the Association have not responded to the exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of Maloney-Belton's 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
FACTS 
Maloney-Belton disputes the Director's finding that she was a retiree and, 
therefore, not entitled to the protections of the Act.1 The facts as we find them to be 
established in the record are set forth below. 
On May 10, 2005, Maloney-Belton filed an improper practice charge in which she 
states that she began her employment with the District in 1993 as a part-time bus 
attendant and part-time lunch monitor. From 2001 to the present, she has been a part-
time lunch monitor at the Roslyn Heights Elementary School. By letter dated August 23, 
2004, Maloney-Belton informed the District that she was retiring "as of September 1, 
2004," from her bus attendant position. Following her retirement, she received health 
1
 38 PERB H4535 (2005). 
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insurance coverage from the District. At the January 13, 2005 school board meeting, 
the District passed a resolution discontinuing health insurance coverage for retired part-
time bus attendants and bus drivers. The retirees' health insurance coverage was 
provided through the New York State Health Insurance Program (NYSHIP). The 
NYSHIP administrative manual, §245, {^1 (a)(3) authorized participating members to 
discontinue health insurance coverage for "all employees or a class of employees 
whose most recent date of employment with the employer is after April 1, 1977." 
Maloney-Belton received a letter, dated January 19, 2005, from Fino M. Celano, 
Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources, advising her that, pursuant to 
NYSHIP's health insurance manual, her retiree health insurance coverage would cease 
as of February 1, 2005. She has alleged, in substance, that because of her friendship 
with the former president of the Association, the District retaliated against her. She 
contends that the former president had a contentious relationship with the District and 
sought, unsuccessfully, to have the part-time bus drivers and monitors included in the 
bargaining unit. Maloney-Belton was viewed as her ally. 
As to the charge against the Association, Maloney-Belton has alleged that she 
was not permitted to be a member of the unit represented by the Association. If she 
were a member of the unit, she would have been contractually entitled to retiree health 
coverage. 
By letter dated May 12, 2005, the Director informed Maloney-Belton that her 
charge against the Association was untimely because no acts or omissions occurring 
within four months of the charge were alleged, nor were any facts alleged to support a 
finding of a violation of §209-a.2(a). As to the District, since Maloney-Belton was never 
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included in the bargaining unit, she was advised that she had failed to allege facts that 
would support finding violations of §§209-a. 1 (a) and (c). As to both the District and the 
Association, the Director advised her that the charge was deficient because she was 
not, and is not, a public employee. 
On May 27, 2005, in response to the Director's deficiency letter, counsel for 
Maloney-Belton informed the Director that she would be filing exceptions to the 
Director's deficiency determination. The Director thereafter dismissed the charge finding 
that Maloney-Belton, as a retiree, cannot file a charge under the Act and also, as 
against the Association, the charge was untimely. 
DISCUSSION 
Maloney-Belton has charged the District with violating §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the 
Act. The Director found that the improper practice charge is deficient. We agree. 
Maloney-Belton contends that the Director erred in concluding that she is no 
longer a public employee because she remains employed by the District as a part-time 
lunch monitor. She also argues that the charge against the Association is timely 
because the District passed its resolution on January 13, 2005, and the Association's 
failure to include her in its bargaining unit continued throughout the limitation period. 
Maloney-Belton's charge focuses on an action by the District taken against her as 
a retiree. She was afforded medical insurance coverage as a part-time bus attendant 
retiree, and those benefits ceased because she was a retiree. The discriminatory act is 
alleged to have been taken as a result of her activities as a school bus monitor, the 
position she is retired from. Maloney-Belton makes no connection between her present 
employment as a school lunch monitor and the alleged discriminatory act. Retirees 
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cannot file improper practices because as retirees they are not public employees within 
the meaning of the Act.2 The Director correctly dismissed the charge against the District 
and the Association on this basis. 
While Maloney-Belton correctly asserts that she is still employed as a part-time 
lunch monitor, this status does not change the result in this case. Section 201.7(a) of 
the Act defines a public employee as a person holding a position by appointment or 
employment in the service of a public employer. If the charging party's part-time status 
raised an issue as to her status as a public employee, the details of her charge are 
sufficient to establish that she would at least meet the alternate definition in §201.7(f). 
However, even if we were to assume that she had standing based on her current 
employment to file the charge, Maloney-Belton has failed to plead facts sufficient to 
support a finding of a violation of §§209-a. 1 (a) and (c) of the Act. Our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules), §204.3(b), require a charging party to submit a charge that contains: 
a clear and concise statement of the facts constituting the alleged 
improper practice, including the names of the individuals involved in 
the alleged improper practice, the time and place of occurrence of 
each particular act alleged, and the subsections of section 209-a of 
the act alleged to have been violated. 
A fair reading of the facts alleged in the charge demonstrates a failure to meet the 
pleading standard set forth in our Rules. Maloney-Belton has alleged in conclusory form 
that the District passed a resolution denying her retiree health insurance as a former 
part-time bus attendant because of her friendship with the past president of the 
Association. This is mere speculation which does not make out a prima facie case. 
2
 See Greece Cent. Sch. Dist., Greece Teachers Ass'n and Nat'l Educ. Ass'n (Lanzillo, 
etal.), 28 PERB 1J3048 (1995), confirmed sub nom. Lanzillo etal. v. PERB, 29 PERB 
1J7003 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1996). 
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Maloney-Belton alleged that the District has always had a policy that all retirees 
receive health insurance coverage and the only condition to receipt of this benefit was 
ten years' of employment. She has failed, however, to make a nexus between the 
resolution passed by the District on January 13, 2005 and any protected activity under 
the Act. Her only connection to protected activity under the Act is her friendship with the 
former president of the Association. A similar argument was advanced in City of 
Rochester1 and rejected by us. The charging party there alleged, in part, retaliation by 
the employer because of his friendship with the union president. We rejected that 
argument because the facts disclosed the employee's conduct to be the cause of the 
employer's critical action taken against him. "The Act [§209-a] ensures that employees 
are not interfered with, discriminated against or improperly advantaged in their 
employment relationship because of their decisions with respect to union membership, 
office or participation."4 
Maloney-Belton alleged in substance that she was denied the opportunity to 
secure contractual rights to the retiree health benefit under the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement because she was not permitted to be a member of the 
Association. Again, however, she makes this conclusory statement without providing 
any factual basis. Without additional facts as to why she was not permitted to join the 
Association and when this might have occurred, we may not speculate as to whether 
such an allegation arguably supports a timely violation of the Act by the Association. 
3
 36 PERB H3025 (2003). 
4
 See County of Nassau, 27 PERB 1J3011, at 3022 (1994). 
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Maloney-Belton has not alleged in her improper practice charge a protected 
activity covered by §209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act. Furthermore, she has not alleged 
facts that would arguably support a timely charge against the Association. Finally, the 
actions, by the District, she complains of affect her in her retiree status and are not 
cognizable under the Act. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the exceptions filed by Maloney-Belton and 
affirm the Director's decision to dismiss the charge. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: September 23, 2005 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
APPENDIX 
5. ARTICLE 13 - HOLIDAYS: (pp. 10-11) 
(NEW) 13.4 Add a new section to read as follows: 
An employee shall be entitled to accumulate and carry over from year to year, any 
unused Holiday compensatory days, including floating Holidays. Any Holiday 
compensatory days off elected not to be used shall be placed in that employee's health 
insurance on retirement account for additional coverage as set forth in Article 23, 
Pension, Group Health and Life Insurance, Section 23.4. However, in the event an 
employee uses all of his/her accumulated sick leave, he/she shall be entitled to use all 
or part of his/her accumulated Holiday compensatory days in the health insurance on 
retirement account to insure a paycheck for that period of time for which the Holiday 
compensatory days cover. However, in the event of a disability retirement as set forth 
in Article 23, Pension, Group Health and Life Insurance, Section 23.4, all unused 
Holiday compensatory days in the employee's health insurance on retirement account 
shall be forfeited and returned to the Employer. 
6. ARTICLE 14 - SICK LEAVE: (pp. 11-12) 
14.2 Amend to read as follows: 
All employees shall be entitled to unlimited accumulation of sick leave. All 
unused accumulated sick leave shall be carried over from year to year. Upon 
retirement, the employee shall be entitled to apply all or any part of his/her unused 
accumulated sick leave for additional health insurance on retirement as set forth in 
Article 23, Pension, Group Health and Life Insurance, Section 23.4. However, in the 
event of a disability retirement as set forth in Article 23, Pension, Group Health and Life 
Insurance, Section 23.4, all unused sick leave in the employee's health insurance on 
retirement account shall be forfeited and returned to the Employer. 
14.3 Delete in its entirety. 
10. ARTICLE 18-WORK DAY AND WORKWEEK: (pp. 14-15) 
(NEW) 18.9 Add a new section to read as follows: 
An employee shall be entitled to accumulate and carry over from year to year, any 
unused compensatory time. Any compensatory time elected not to be used shall be 
placed in that employee's health insurance on retirement account for additional 
coverage as set forth in Article 23, Pension, Group Health and Life Insurance, Section 
23.4. However, in the event an employee uses all of his/her accumulated sick leave, 
he/she shall be entitled to use all or part of his/her accumulated compensatory time in 
the health insurance on retirement account to insure a paycheck for that period of time 
for which the vacation time covers. However, in the event of a disability retirement as 
set forth in Article 23, Pension, Group Health and Life Insurance, Section 23.4, all 
unused compensatory time in the employee's health insurance on retirement account 
shall be forfeited and returned to the Employer. 
12. ARTICLE 23 - PENSION, GROUP HEALTH AND LIFE INSURANCE PLANS: 
(pp. 18-19) 
23.4 Amend to read as follows: 
An employee who retires shall be provided with the same level of benefits 
contained in the Core Plus Medical and Psychiatric Enhancements Plan as described in 
the New York State Insurance Plan (known as the Empire Plan) provided to active 
employees, or if elected, the HMO MVP 10+. The Employer shall contribute towards 
the premium cost of 50% for individual and an additional 35% of the difference for 
dependent coverage without returning any paid leave accumulation set forth below. 
The Employer shall provide additional contribution towards the premium cost of health 
insurance based on the following schedule for the return of paid leave: 
Unused Sick Leave, Compensatory Time, 
Chart Days, Vacation, Holidays and/or Percent of Health Insurance 
Personal Leave Days Premium Paid by the Employer 
105-114 
115-124 
125-134 
135-144 
145-154 
155-164 
165-174 
175 
Individual 
65% 
70% 
75% 
80% 
85% 
90% 
95% 
100% 
Dependent 
65% 
70% 
75% 
80% 
85% 
90% 
95% 
100% 
An employee who receives a disability retirement from the New York State Police 
and Fire Retirement System shall receive individual and/or dependent health insurance 
with the Employer paying one hundred percent (100%) of the premium cost without 
returning any accumulation as set forth above. 
In the event an employee does not return any accumulation, as set forth above, for 
additional percent of health insurance premium paid by the Employer, that accumulation 
shall be paid to the employee in the first (1st) pay period following separation or 
retirement. However, in the event that an employee exceeds 175 days, he/she would 
be paid for all accumulated paid leave not returned. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SARA-ANN P. FEARON, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-23556 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondent, 
- and -
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
SHELLMAN D. JOHNSON, for Charging Party 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (MARIA ELENA GONZALEZ of 
counsel), for Respondent 
DALE C. KUTZBACH (MICHELE A. BAPTISTE of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
This matter comes to us on a motion by Sara-Ann P. Fearon for reconsideration 
of the Board's Decision and Order, dated September 30, 2004,1 on the grounds of 
1
 37 PERB H3029 (2004). See also UFT (Fearon), 37 PERB 1J3007 (2004); UFT 
(Fearon), 36 PERB 1J3023 (2003). 
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newly-discovered evidence. The Board of Education of the City School District of the 
City of New York (District) opposes the motion.2 
FACTS 
The Board rendered a Decision and Order, dated September 30, 2004, 
dismissing Fearon's improper practice charge alleging that the United Federation of 
Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT) violated §209-1.2(c) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it refused to take a grievance she had filed to step 
three of the grievance procedure. 
On July 10, 2005, Fearon, through her representative, Shellman Johnson, moved 
this Board to reconsider its prior decision on the grounds of newly-discovered evidence. 
In the motion papers, Johnson refers only to statements and exhibits that were offered 
in the improper practice hearing, as well as his legal argument in support of 
reconsideration. 
DISCUSSION 
We have followed the rationale articulated by the Court of Appeals in Evans v. 
Monaghan, 306 NY 312, 326 (1954), in cases where the party moves to reopen 
proceedings on the basis of newly-discovered evidence.3 The Court imposed two 
limitations: the first is to refuse to reopen proceedings when, with due diligence, the new 
evidence was obtainable before the close of the original trial, and the second is that the 
2
 The District is made a statutory party pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act. 
3
 See UFT(Zito), 35 PERB 1J3015 (2002). 
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movant must demonstrate that the evidence, if introduced at a trial, would probably 
have produced a different result.4 
Applying these two limitations to the allegations in support of the motion requires 
a denial of Fearon's motion. Johnson simply reargues the issues raised in the improper 
practice charge by contending that UFT disregarded a stipulated settlement of Fearon's 
1998 grievance and thereby breached its duty of fair representation to Fearon. He 
concludes that the ALJ's decision to deny UFT's motion to dismiss at the close of 
Fearon's direct case supports his theory that Fearon proved a prima facie case and that 
the ALJ's subsequent decision to reverse her earlier ruling denying the motion to 
dismiss, absent a motion for reconsideration, was reversible error. Lastly, Johnson 
argues that an action for violation of a union's duty of fair representation will lie 
whenever an employee is solely dependent on a union to process a grievance and the 
union's actions wrongfully prejudice the grievant. 
Although Johnson has zealously advocated for his client, he has made no 
showing that any evidence was newly discovered. Rather, he argues that he offered 
certain amendments to the charge that were not considered relevant or timely by the 
ALJ.5 Consequently, he has not demonstrated any grounds for reconsideration, nor has 
he adequately explained the delay in making the instant motion for reconsideration. We 
also find that there are no extraordinary circumstances that merit consideration of this 
4
 Id. 
5
 See UFT (Fearon), 37 PERB 1J3029 (2004), supra, note 1 
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motion.6 Having reviewed the record in this case, we are not persuaded that we have 
overlooked or misapprehended any material fact or misapplied any controlling principle 
of law in our original decision. For these reasons, we deny the motion for 
reconsideration of our September 30, 2004 decision in this matter. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: September 23, 2005 
New York, New York 
-'7i 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
ixcluu^^^^-^^^ 
6
 City of Buffalo, 25 PERB 1J3031 (1992). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 106 -
TRANSIT SUPERVISORS ORGANIZATION, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-25031 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent, 
-and -
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION, 
LOCAL 100, AFL-CIO 
Intervenor. 
COLLERAN, O'HARA and MILLS, L.L.P. (EDWARD J. GROARKE of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, GENERAL COUNSEL AND VICE PRESIDENT 
(VICTOR M. LEVY of counsel), for Respondent 
KENNEDY, SCHWARTZ & CURE, PC (ARTHUR SCHWARTZ of counsel), for 
Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Transport Workers Union, Local 
106, Transit Supervisors Organization (TSO) to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) dismissing its improper practice charge, which alleged that the New York 
City Transit Authority (Authority) had violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally transferred exclusive bargaining unit work to 
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Station Agents, represented by the Transit Workers Union, Local 100, AFL-CIO (TWU). 
TWU intervened in the proceeding. The Authority has filed cross-exceptions to the ALJ's 
decision. 
EXCEPTIONS 
TSO excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred when he found 
that the work in question was not exclusive to TSO's bargaining unit work. The Authority 
cross-excepts to the ALJ's decision, asserting that the ALJ erred by failing to dismiss 
the improper practice charge as untimely filed, failing to find that TSO was collaterally 
estopped from filing the instant charge and by allowing TSO to expand the scope of the 
improper practice charge to include the Authority's pilot customer service program. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we modify and, as modified, affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision1 and are set forth here only as 
necessary to address the exceptions and cross-exceptions. 
In 1985, a re-organization occurred at the Authority in the Station Department,2 
which resulted in a two-level station supervisor title, Station Supervisor I (SSI) and 
Station Supervisor II (SSII). The SSII title is represented by TSO; employees in the SSI 
title are represented by the Subway-Surface Supervisors Association (SSSA).3 SSIIs 
1
 38 PERB H4523 (2005). 
2
 The Station Department (Station) has jurisdiction over the operation of the subway 
token booths and the physical appearance of the Authority's subway stations. See New 
York City Transit Auth., 26 PERB 1J4595 (1986). 
3
 Although afforded the opportunity to do so, SSSA did not intervene in this proceeding. 
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supervise SSIs and employees in that title, in turn, supervise hourly employees, 
including Station Agents. 
SSI Is are responsible for the inspection of certain areas at each station, 
including: outside areas, stairways and railings; mezzanines and platforms; booths, 
turnstiles and exit gates; toilets, rooms and offices; signs, windows, tiles and walls; 
refuse areas, solar cans and canisters; lights and concessionaires; elevators and 
escalators, and personnel on duty. When an SSI is promoted to the SSII title, he or she 
receives training regarding these tasks. 
SSIs are assigned to mobile wash teams or heavy duty cleaning teams and are 
responsible for supervising the hourly employees assigned to them to accomplish those 
tasks. Employees in the SSI title who are assigned to field work are responsible for 
supervising Station Agents and for investigations, inspections and booth audits. 
As we found in an earlier decision involving these titles, SSIs and SSIIs perform 
many of the same tasks.4 We have found previously that the SSIs exercise supervisory 
responsibility over employees working at groups of one or more subway stations or 
"zones"; conduct revenue or "booth" audits in station booths manned by station clerks 
located at subway stations throughout the subway system; and conduct investigations 
of operational/mechanical problems with subway turnstiles and gates and of passenger 
accidents. In confirming our decision that the SSIIs did not have exclusivity over those 
three areas, the Appellate Division noted that "there was significant overlap between the 
tasks performed by Level I and Level II supervisors, with each essentially performing 
4
 NYCTA, 35 PERB 1J3028 (2002), confirmed sub nom. Romaine v Cuevas, 305 AD2d, 
36 PERB H7010 (3d Dep't 2003) 
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the same functions", finding that "[t]his significant overlap...goes beyond sporadic 
episodes of Level I supervisors 'helping out' Level II supervisors and, hence, negates 
any claim of exclusivity [citations omitted]."5 
Rule 166 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Employees Engaged in the 
Operation of the New York City Transit Authority (Rules) sets forth the SSIs' job duties 
as conducting inspections and recommending appropriate action on the condition of 
stations and station equipment. The duties of the SSIIs include conducting inspections 
and taking appropriate action on the condition of stations and station equipment. SSIs 
fill out a narrative form, detailing any defects they observe while supervising employees 
and conducting inspections. SSIIs complete a nine-point inspection list that includes 
both checking boxes for completion of specific tasks and a narrative. 
With respect to the instant charge, by letter dated January 12, 2004, the Authority 
transmitted to TSO President Robert Romaine a new edition of the Rules that would be 
distributed to all employees later that month. TSO alleges that the duties and 
responsibilities of Station Agents set forth in Rule 15.02 includes inspection duties that 
had previously been exclusively performed by the SSIIs. Rule 15.02 states, in relevant 
part, that the Station Agents conduct: "Station inspections (light outages, 
elevator/escalator service, reporting unsanitary conditions, structural defects, hazardous 
conditions, public telephones); and provides emergency assistance to customers as 
directed by management." 
While not included in the original charge or the particularization of the charge, 
TSO introduced evidence at the hearing, over the Authority's objection, about additional 
5
 Romaine v. Cuevas, 305 AD2d 968, 970 (3d Dep't 2003). 
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inspection duties being assigned to non-unit employees. The Authority initiated a pilot 
program in May 2004 in which Station Agents are designated as Station Customer 
Assistants to spend time outside the toll booth providing more direct customer service. 
The Station Customer Assistants are responsible for the station environment, which 
includes inspecting for graffiti, defects, and vandalism in several areas within each 
station. 
DISCUSSION 
The Authority asserted in its answer and in its cross-exceptions that the charge 
was untimely filed and that TSO was collaterally estopped from litigating the charge 
because of our finding in the previous case involving the inspection and investigation 
duties of the SSIIs.6 The ALJ did not reach either of these two defenses because he 
dismissed the charge on the merits. 
We address the timeliness defense raised by the Authority first. The Authority 
argues that the instant charge is untimely because as far back as May 2001, TSO knew 
that other employees were performing inspection duties, as is evidenced by the charge 
it filed in New York City Transit Authority, supra, note 4. As noted earlier, that charge 
involved the assignment of inspection duties to SSIs, not Station Agents. While we 
found in the earlier decision that inspection duties had not been exclusively performed 
by SSIIs, that charge did not involve the assignment of inspection duties to Station 
Agents, but to SSIs. TSO did not receive notice of the assignment of inspection duties 
to Station Agents inherent in Rule 15.02 until the Authority's transmittal of the new rules 
6
 Supra, note 4. 
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to TSO in January 2005. The charge alleging that the assignment of those duties to 
Station Agents was timely filed in May 2005. 
The Authority also argues that TSO's introduction of evidence dealing with the 
Authority's pilot customer service program at the second day of hearing in the instant 
charge was improper because the Authority had no notice that TSO intended to do so 
and that any allegations that the program involved the unilateral transfer of TSO 
bargaining unit work were untimely. The ALJ allowed the evidence about the pilot 
program into the record, finding that it was within the scope of the improper practice 
charge. We disagree and reverse the ALJ's ruling. 
The pilot customer service program was initiated in May 2004, after the date the 
instant charge was filed. TSO thereafter, pursuant to the ALJ's order, particularized the 
charge in June 2004. In neither the original charge nor the response to the order for 
particularization did TSO include the pilot customer service program. Its attempt to 
introduce evidence about the program at the second day of hearing on November 30, 
2004, improperly sought to amend the charge to include an allegation that the pilot 
customer service program was an additional unilateral assignment of duties of the SSIIs 
to Station Agents. Such an allegation should have been the subject of a proper 
amendment to the charge or a new improper practice charge. In addition, allegations 
about the program, made six months after the initiation of the program, are untimely. 
We next address whether the exclusivity issue raised in the instant charge is the 
same as the issue decided by us in 2002,7 in order to reach the collateral estoppel 
defense raised by the Authority. 
7
 Id. 
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TSO argues that there is a discernible boundary that can be drawn around the 
nine-point inspections performed by the SSIIs that is not affected by the general 
inspections performed by the SSIs in the course of the performance of their duties. In 
doing so, TSO asserts that the work in-issue in the instant case is not the same as the 
duties that were in-issue in the prior case. We find that the duties that were in issue in 
2002 are the same duties that are raised in the instant case. 
In Town of West Seneca, where we first articulated the concept of discernible 
boundary, we held that the exclusivity of unit work is not lost if the practice of utilizing 
nonunit employees is one which is clearly circumscribed.8 A charging party must 
establish a discernible boundary to the claimed unit work which would set it apart from 
work done by non-unit personnel.9 Here, TSO has failed to do so. The record 
establishes that SSIs perform inspections in both single stations and zones, the nature 
of the inspections is substantially similar to those performed by SSIIs and the reports 
completed by both SSIs and SSIIs are similar. The distinctions between the work 
performed by the two titles are not sufficient to establish a discernible boundary around 
the nine-point inspections performed by the SSIIs. 
In our earlier decision dealing with the job duties of SSIIs and SSIs, we affirmed 
the decision of the ALJ which found that: 
Lastly, regarding the issue of investigating mechanical 
problems and passenger accidents, exclusivity was again 
not convincingly established. The TSO attempted to 
characterize the work of the SSIs in this area as performing 
only inspections, compared to the investigative role of the 
B
 19 PERB H3028(1986). 
9
 County of Nassau, 21 PERB 1J3038 (1988). 
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SSIIs. Indeed, one document offered into evidence identifies 
"inspections" as being within the duties of the SSIs, with 
"investigations" delegated to the higher rank. However, 
Glasgow [Director of Labor Relations-Station Divisions] 
characterized the distinction as meaningless in practice. He 
countered that investigation is necessary to perform the type 
of "inspections" of a problem site that are required of the 
SSIs and that the report which the SSI compiles is 
dependent upon thorough investigation and not different 
from that produced by an SSI I.10 
Based on that decision, the Authority argues that TSO is collaterally estopped 
from litigating whether inspections are exclusively the work of SSIIs. The doctrine of 
collateral estoppel precludes parties from relitigating, in a subsequent proceeding, 
issues of fact or law clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against 
that party or those in privity, whether or not the causes of action are the same. Its basic 
requirements are that the issues be identical, that there was an opportunity to litigate 
the issue,11 that it was essential to the determination and that it was ultimate or material 
in both actions.12 The inquiry here asks whether there is a factual finding in the prior 
case on the job duties of SSIs and SSIIs which was both necessary to that case's 
determination and relevant in this action. The ALJ noted our prior decision and found 
that it was supportive of his finding that the work here in-issue is not exclusive to SSIIs, 
although not dispositive of the issue. 
But we find that the requirements necessary to establish collateral estoppel in the 
instant case have been met. The dispositive issue in both cases is the same: whether 
10
 NYCTA, 35 PERB H4526, at 4610, aff'd, 35 PERB 1J3028 (2002), confirmed sub nom. 
Romaine v. Cuevas, 305 AD2d 968 (3d Dep't 2003). 
11
 See Jeffreys v Griffith, 1 NY3d 34 (2003); Ryan vNew York Telephone Co., 62 NY2d 
494(1984) 
12
 Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 NY2d 65 (1969). 
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the performance of inspections in the stations or zones is exclusively the work of SSIIs. 
In the previous decision we found that it is not. The issue of inspections was fully 
litigated in the prior case. Indeed, TSO conceded that inspections had been performed 
by both SSIIs and SSIs after the Authority's reorganization. The determination that 
inspections are not the exclusive bargaining unit work of SSIIs is essential to the 
decision in both matters and is material and dispositive. Finally, the parties (TSO and 
the Authority) in both cases are identical. The fact that TSO here complains that the 
exclusive bargaining unit work of inspections has been assigned to Station Agents and 
in the prior case it asserted that the work of investigations (a natural corollary to 
inspections13) had been improperly assigned to SSIs does not warrant a contrary 
conclusion. The dispositive issue is the same: inspections have not been exclusively 
performed by the SSIIs in TSO's bargaining unit. 
We find, therefore, that TSO is collaterally estopped from asserting exclusivity 
over inspections conducted by SSIIs and that the charge alleging that the Authority 
violated §209-a. 1 (d) of the Act when it listed inspections as one of the job 
responsibilities of Station Agents in Rule 15.02 sent to TSO in January 2004, must be 
dismissed. 
For the reasons set forth above, we deny TSO's exceptions, grant the cross-
exceptions of the Authority as to the pilot customer service program and collateral 
estoppel, and, as modified, affirm the decision of the ALJ dismissing the charge. 
13
 Supra, note 10. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, that the charge is dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: September 23, 2005 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Jphn T. Mitchell, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Mohammad Saidin to a decision of 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing his improper practice charge. The 
charge alleged that the United Federation of Teachers, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT) 
violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it failed 
to file a grievance on his behalf following the denial of Saidin's license reapplication as 
an elementary school teacher by the Board of Education of the City School District of 
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the City of New York (District), which is made a statutory party pursuant to §209-a.3 of 
the Act. 
EXCEPTIONS 
Saidin excepts to the ALJ's decision on the grounds that the ALJ erred on the law 
and the facts. Saidin contends that the ALJ excluded from the record decisions of 
independent arbitrators that supported his position. UFT submitted a response in 
opposition to the exceptions. Saidin subsequently submitted a document labeled cross-
exceptions. UFT objects to PERB's consideration of the cross-exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision1 and are repeated here only as 
necessary to decide the exceptions. 
On July 15, 2004, Saidin filed an improper practice charge that alleged, as 
amended, that UFT failed to prosecute the grievance that he filed pursuant to Article 20 
of the collective bargaining agreement between the UFT and the District, over the 
District's refusal to re-license him as an elementary school teacher because of his 
Muslim first name and failed to demonstrate to the District that there were mitigating 
factors to consider. A hearing on the improper practice charge was scheduled for 
March 8, 2005, at which time the parties agreed to submit a stipulation of facts. On 
March 30, 2005, the parties submitted to the ALJ a stipulation of facts consisting of: 
1. A copy of the collective bargaining agreement. 
1
 38 PERB H4545 (2005). 
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2. Chancellor's Regulation C-105. 
3. Chancellor's Regulation C-205. 
4. Affidavit of Howard Solomon. 
5. Arbitration decision regarding Article 20 is covered in paragraphs 3 
and 9 of the Solomon affidavit. 
6. An affidavit of Lucille Swein was not submitted by UFT because it 
would be duplicative of the information in the Solomon affidavit. 
The stipulation was signed by Saidin as well as the representatives of the other parties. 
Solomon's affidavit states that he is the Director of UFT's grievance department; 
that on December 12, 2003, Saidin's application for a license was denied by the 
District's Office of Personnel Investigation (OPI); that Saidin was informed of his right to 
appeal the decision within 30 days to the Director of Human Resources; and that his 
subsequent appeal was denied on February 13, 2004. 
The Chancellor's Regulation C-105 vests with the District's Chancellor "the power 
and duty to ensure compliance with qualifications established for all personnel 
employed in the city district." Regulation C-105 also establishes procedures for 
background investigations conducted by the OPI within the Division of Human 
Resources (DHR). At the conclusion of such investigation, the OPI may approve the 
application for licensure or recommend that it be denied. Any recommendation to deny 
licensure is referred to DHR's Chief Executive who has the authority to make the final 
decision to approve or deny the application. 
Following the February 13, 2004 denial of his license reapplication, Saidin 
requested that UFT file a grievance on his behalf under Article 20 of the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement. Article 20, entitled "Matters Not Covered", concerns 
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matters not covered by the agreement about which the District agreed to consult with 
UFT prior to making changes. Article 20 also states that: 
All existing determinations, authorizations, by-laws, regulations, rules, 
rulings, resolutions, certifications, orders, directives and other actions, 
made, issued or entered into by the Board of Education governing or 
affecting salary and working conditions of the employees in the 
bargaining unit shall continue in force during the term of this 
Agreement, except insofar as change is commanded by law. 
Saidin was informed that the parties' collective bargaining agreement does not provide a 
grievance mechanism for the denial of a license application. UFT informed Saidin that 
Chancellor's Regulation C-105 provides for only an administrative review by DHR's 
Chief Executive. 
UFT offered Saidin assistance with regard to the evidence to be presented during 
the administrative review. Solomon's staff, however, could not find any grievances under 
Article 20 related to Saidin's situation. 
On April 28, 2005, UFT moved to dismiss Saidin's improper practice charge. Saidin 
opposed the motion to dismiss, referencing newspaper articles describing various issues 
unrelated to the charge in the New York City schools in an attempt to argue that he 
should not have been denied a license. 
DISCUSSION 
Saidin's cross-exceptions are in the nature of a reply to UFT's response. 
However, PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules) do not provide for a reply to a response 
to exceptions and filings that the Rules do not specifically allow must be authorized or 
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requested by the Board. In this case, they were not and consequently, they will be not 
considered.2 
In order to establish a breach of the duty of fair representation, a charging party 
must prove that the employee organization acted in a manner that was arbitrary, 
discriminatory or in bad faith.3 In deciding UFT's motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in 
the pleadings and stipulated record must be viewed in a light most favorable to Saidin 
and every reasonable inference must be given to the facts that he alleged.4 Here, the 
facts pled by Saidin do not establish a breach of the duty of fair representation in 
violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Act, only dissatisfaction with UFT's strategy in handling 
Saidin's grievance, which does not establish a violation of the Act.5 
UFT explained to Saidin that Article 20 of the collective bargaining agreement, 
was not relevant to his case. Even if UFT had been incorrect in its analysis of Saidin's 
grievance, a violation of the Act is not established because mere error in judgment does 
not breach the duty of fair representation.6 
Saidin's allegations that UFT representatives discriminated against him because 
of his Muslim first name, that UFT had processed other employees' grievances 
differently in circumstances similar to his, and that UFT had conspired with the District 
2
 Section 213 of PERB's Rules. 
3
 Civil Service Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. PERB and Diaz 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 1J7024 
(3d Dep't 1987), affirmed on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB 1J7017. 
4County of Nassau (Police Dep't) (Unterweiser), 17 PERB 1J3013 (1984). 
5Local 1655, District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 25 PERB 1J3008 (1992). 
6
 Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and State of New York (Div. of Parole), 35 PERB 
1J3023 (2002). 
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against him are conclusory and cannot be the basis of a violation because they are 
unsupported by the stipulation of facts.7 
Lastly, the ALJ correctly excluded the newspaper articles because they were not 
part of the stipulated record and, therefore, could not be considered on the motion to 
dismiss.8 
Based on the foregoing, Saidin's exceptions are denied and the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: September 23, 2005 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Jphn T. Mitchell, Member 
7
 Civil Service Employees Ass'n, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 32 PERB 1J3044 
(1999). 
8
 Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 32 PERB 1J3069 (1999). 
